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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
I. SUPREME COURT DEMANDS STRICTER ENFORCEMENT OF
CONFIDENTIALITY RULES
In In re an Anonymous Member of the South Carolina Bar1 the
South Carolina Supreme Court warned the South Carolina Bar that it
would no longer condone unwitting violations of rule 20 of the Su-
preme Court Rules on Disciplinary Procedure.2 The court also held
that the confidentiality requirements of rule 20 apply to all parties in a
grievance proceeding and even to the attorney under investigation.3
This case arose after an attorney represented a couple in an adop-
tion proceeding in which the wife sought to have her new husband
adopt her natural child. The family court judge required an uncondi-
tional consent from the child's biological father. The biological father
was willing to give his consent, but the attorney failed to obtain it. As a
result, the couple filed a complaint with the Board of Commissioners
on Grievances and Discipline.4 A board member intervened, obtained
the consent, and forwarded it to the attorney. Again, the attorney
failed to take further action. The supreme court held that the attor-
1. 297 S.C. 527, 377 S.E.2d 572 (1989).
2. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. 20. The rule provides in part:
A. All records and proceedings involving allegations of Misconduct by an at-
torney shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed unless:
(1) The Respondent shall in writing request that they be public;
(2) The investigation is predicated upon the conviction of the respondent
for a crime or upon public discipline imposed on the Respondent in an-
other jurisdiction.
3. Anonymous Member, 297 S.C. at 530, 377 S.E.2d at 574.
4. Anyone can file a complaint with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances
and Discipline. Upon the filing of a complaint, the chairman of the executive committee
reviews the grievance. If the complaint is not frivolous, the chairman will inform the
lawyer in writing and request a written response. The chairman usually appoints a mem-
ber of the board or an associate commissioner to investigate the grievance. The investiga-
tive report usually is due within 60 days. The executive committee makes a probable
cause determination when it receives the investigative report. If probable cause exists,
the committee will issue a complaint. Next, a panel composed of three members of the
board will hear the case. The hearing panel makes findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and recommends sanctions if any are appropriate. The attorney may appeal the panel's
report to the executive committee and the supreme court. See generally Haynsworth,
Disciplinary Actions by the South Carolina Supreme Court and the Board of Commis-
sioners on Grievances and Discipline: Lawyers Beware, 36 S.C.L. REv. 309, 326-36 (1985)
(explains lawyer disciplinary process).
1
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ney's inaction was a neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him and the
court issued a private reprimand.5
After the attorney responded to the grievance board, he sent cop-
ies of his response to the family court judge presiding over the case,
the family court coordinator, and the guardian ad litem. The attorney
also publicly spoke of the matter.' Thus, the attorney violated the
rules of confidentiality.
The supreme court used its opinion in Anonymous Member as an
opportunity to "call the bar's attention to paragraph 20 ofthe Rules on
Disciplinary Procedure. . . ." The court held that this rule applies to
all parties to the grievance proceeding, including the attorney under
investigation."
Under rule 20 a grievance proceeding can be discussed publicly
only in the following three situations: (1) if the attorney under investi-
gation waives the confidentiality of the proceeding by a written request
that the proceeding be public; (2) if the investigation is based upon a
criminal conviction; and (3) if the investigation is based upon public
discipline in another jurisdiction.9 The attorney under investigation
cannot discuss the matter unless one of these conditions is met.10
The court's reasoning initially may appear unsound. The apparent
purpose of a confidentiality rule is to protect an attorney's reputation
from the harm that could result from a frivolous complaint., There-
fore, the attorney arguably should not be compelled to accept that pro-
tection. In a similar case, the California Supreme Court stated, "Al-
though the State Bar has a duty to protect an attorney by keeping a
pending investigation against him confidential. . . the attorney is not
compelled to accept that protection. 1 2 The South Carolina Supreme
Court's decision appears rigid because an attorney must file a written
request before he is able to speak publicly about his own investigation.
Despite this apparent anomaly, the. court's decision can be justi-
fied on two grounds. First, the decision's bright-line rule provides cer-
tainty. Under rule 20, a violation of the confidentiality requirement is
5. Anonymous Member, 297 S.C. at 528-29, 377 S.E.2d at 573-74. The court based
this decision on the Model Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary rule 6-
101(A)(3), which prohibits a lawyer-from the neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him.
See S.C. Sup. CT. R. 33.
6. Anonymous Member, 297 S.C. at 529, 377 S.E.2d at 573.
7. Id. at 530, 377 S.E.2d at 574.
8. Id.
9. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. 20(A).
10. Anonymous Member, 297 S.C. at 530, 377 S.E.2d at 574.
11. See Peterson v. Sheran, 474 F. Supp. 1215, 1221 (D. Minn. 1979), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 635 F.2d 1335 (8th Cir. 1980).
12. Jacoby v. State Bar of Cal., 19 Cal. 3d 359, 368 n.5, 562 P.2d 1326, 1332 n.5, 138
Cal. Rptr. 77, 83 n.5 (1977).
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considered to be contempt of court."3 For example, if the court deter-
mines that someone is in contempt for speaking publicly about a griev-
ance proceeding in which no written request has been filed by the at-
torney charged, but the attorney has been speaking publicly about the
proceeding himself, the person could claim that the attorney had
waived confidentiality by his conduct. This would require a factual de-
termination. Under the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision, how-
ever, no need for a factual determination exists. Unless the investiga-
tion is based upon a criminal conviction or discipline in another
jurisdiction, the court must ascertain only whether or not a written re-
quest is present. Thus, the court's decision promotes judicial
economy."
The second and more persuasive justification for the supreme
court's decision is found in the language of the rule itself. Rule 20 spe-
cifically includes the attorney under investigation in a list of persons
who shall not "mention the existence of any such proceeding, nor dis-
close any information pertaining thereto."' 5 Therefore, if the court
holds that the rule does not apply to the attorney under investigation,
the court contradicts the plain language of the rule itself.
Whether or not it is proper, "[t]raditionally, the disciplinary pro-
cess has been conducted in secret."'" A rule on confidentiality serves
three purposes. First, the confidentiality rule serves to protect the rep-
utation of an attorney who is the subject of a meritless complaint. 7
Second, the rule protects the person who brings the complaint. 8 With-
out this confidentiality, the complainant might be harrassed by the at-
torney under investigation or by his friends. Third, the rule maintains
the integrity of the grievance board by protecting the board members
from outside influences. 19 Thus, strong policy reasons support a confi-
dentiality rule. Furthermore, some commentators argue that the pro-
13. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. 20(E).
14. Anonymous Member, 297 S.C. at 530, 377 S.E.2d at 574.
15. S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. 20(D).
16. S. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 3.4, at 107 (1986).
17. See Peterson, 474 F. Supp. at 1221. This is probably the primary purpose in
South Carolina because an attorney is given discretion to determine whether he wants
the grievance proceeding to be made public. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. Disc. P. 20(A)(1).
18. Younger v. Solomon, 38 Cal. 3d 289, 298, 113 Cal. Rptr. 113, 119 (Dist. Ct. App.
1974). A South Carolina case illustrates this purpose. In In re Edwards, 279 S.C. 89, 302
S.E.2d 339, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 935 (1983), an attorney who was subject to an investi-
gation sued the complainant for criminal and civil libel actions. The court held that the
attorney's actions violated rule 20.
19. People v. Pacheco, 199 Colo. 470, 472, 618 P.2d 1102, 1104 (1980); Shaman &
Begue, Silence Isn't Always Golden: Reassessing Confidentiality in the Judicial Disci-
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ceedings should follow even higher standards of confidentiality. 0
On the other hand, strong arguments support the removal of confi-
dentiality rules from grievance proceedings. The most compelling rea-
son is to reinforce the integrity of the disciplinary system in the eyes of
the public.2 1 If the public is aware of attorney misconduct,22 and if rel-
atively few grievances result in discipline, 23 the public will.suspect cor-
ruption and illegitimate dealing. Moreover, "the public has an interest
in systems that purport to be operated in order to protect the pub-
lic." 2' The primary reason for the disciplinary system is to protect the
public and the courts from an unfit practitioner.25 Also, it is inequita-
ble for a judicial system to protect the rights of freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly in proceedings against
nonattorneys that are based upon "probable cause criminal charges,"
but at the same time deny these rights in proceedings that are based
on probable cause against lawyers.26 Finally, because the public grants
lawyers, through licensing requirements, a monopoly to deliver legal
services, the public should be allowed to be present at proceedings in
which an abuse of a lawyer's license is called into question.,
A confidentiality rule should attempt to reconcile the conflict be-
tween secrecy and openness. 2s This requires courts to balance the in-
20. See Nordby, The Burdened Privilege: Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary Pro-
ceedings, 30 S.C.L. REv. 363, 401 (1979) (suggests that disciplinary orders should be cap-
tioned anonymously because no legitimate public interest is served by having a respon-
dent's name published).
21. Winter, Open Up Lawyer Discipline, A.BA B. LEADER, Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 25.
22. The public arguably should not know because all participants in the grievance
proceeding are subject to the same confidentiality rules. Rule 20, however, may apply
only to participants. The public may know of an attorney's misconduct even without
knowing of a grievance proceeding. For instance, the public might learn of misconduct
through the press. Furthermore, if the press is not a party to the grievance proceeding,
the press cannot be punished for publishing information about it. See Landmark Com-
munications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837-42 (1978).
23. In 1985 in South Carolina, approximately 7.5% of all grievances resulted in a
disciplinary sanction. See Haynsworth, supra note 4, at 326.
24. S. WOLFRAM, supra note 16, at 107.
25. In re Burr, 267 S.C. 419, 423, 228 S.E.2d 678, 680 (1976).
26. Gray & Harrison, Standards for Lawyer Discipline and Disability Proceedings
and the Evaluation of Lawyer Discipline Systems, 11 CAP. U.L. REV. 529, 546-50 (1982).
27. Id.
28. A confidentiality rule must comport with the Constitution as well. In
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837-42 (1978), the Supreme
Court held that a third person who is not a party to a judicial disciplinary proceeding
carnot be subjected to fines for publishing truthful information about the proceeding.
The South Carolina rule provides that "[n]o persons whomsoever in any way connected
with a matter before the Board, or otherwise,... shall mention the existence of any
such proceeding, nor disclose any information pertaining thereto. . . ." S.C. Sup. CT. R.
Disc P. 20(D). If the words "or otherwise" include persons who are not involved in the
[Vol. 42
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terests of the attorney under investigation with the interests of the
public. The South Carolina rule unfortunately does not achieve this
balance. In South Carolina "unless the respondent requests otherwise
in writing, all the proceedings are completely confidential until such
time as the supreme court authorizes publication of an opinion con-
taining a public sanction, temporary suspension, or transfer to disabil-
ity inactive status.""9 Thus, the public is not informed of any action
until the supreme court publishes a decision. Moreover, the general
public is not familiar with judicial opinions and cannot be expected to
read them. Indeed, the published decision is all that the public re-
ceives, and the file itself is not subject to disclosure.-3 Therefore, the
South Carolina rule neglects the public interest.
To solve this problem, perhaps South Carolina should adopt the
approach of the American Bar Association's Model Rules for Lawyer
Disciplinary Enforcement. Under the ABA rules, a grievance proceed-
ing is confidential until the filing and service of formal charges,"1 at
which time the proceeding becomes public. This rule protects attorneys
from the harm that could result from the publicity of a frivolous com-
plaint.3 2 Once the board finds that probable cause exists, however, a
frivolous complaint is no longer a serious risk. At this point, the inter-
ests of the public become paramount, and if the complaint lacks fur-
ther merit, the court will vindicate the attorney under investigation
through the hearing.
23
This rule will benefit the bar as a whole. Greater openness in deal-
ing with allegations of impropriety will result in greater respect for the
law and the legal profession.3 4 The ABA rule will bring renewed confi-
dence and credibility to the disciplinary proceeding. This "renewed
proceeding, the rule may be an unconstitutional infringement upon protected speech.
See Landmark Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. at 837-42. See generally Erickson, First
Amendment Limitations on the Confidentiality of Lawyer Disciplinary and Disability
Proceedings, 67 Ky. L.J. 823 (1978) (examines confidentiality and First Amendment lim-
its on confidentiality requirements).
29. Haynsworth, supra note 4, at 333.
30. Id. Some courts, however, have held that the file is subject to public disclosure.
See, e.g., Sadler v. Oregon State Bar, 275 Or. 279, 281-86, 550 P.2d 1218, 1220-22 (1976)
(held certain records subject to disclosure under state public records law). See generally
Annotation, Restricting Access to Records of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Attor-
neys, 83 A.L.R.3d 749 (1978); Annotation, Discovery or Inspection of State Bar Records
of Complaints Against or Investigations of Attorneys, 83 A.L.R.3d 777 (1978) (discusses
whether records of complaints against attorneys are subject to public disclosure or dis-
covery devices).
31. MODEL RULES FOR DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT § 16 (1989).
32. But see In re Arkansas Bar Ass'n, 282 Ark. 605, 607 (1984) (states that an
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confidence and credibility . . . from the public's perspective far out-
weighs the risk of unjustified criticism and the potential loss of profes-
sional reputation." 35
Mac D. Heavener, III
35. Gray & Harrison, supra note 26, at 547.
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